Difference between revisions of "Multichain (ANY)"

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==History==
==History==


* Rebranded from Anyswap to Multichain (2022).
* Rebranded from Anyswap to [[Multichain]] (2022).


==Audits==
==Audits==


*[[bug bounty|Bug bounty]] program can be found [insert here].  
*This protocol [https://www.defisafety.com/pqrs/418 offers] an active [[bug bounty]] of [https://medium.com/multichainorg/multichain-collaborate-with-immunefi-to-launch-a-bug-bounty-program-e6f2952c1ca5 $2M] (15-3-2022).  
*[https://www.rekt.news/anyswap-rekt/ From] [[Rekt]] (13-7-2021):  
*Scored [https://www.defisafety.com/pqrs/418 36%] on [[DeFi Safety]] (15-3-2022):
''"[[Contracts]] can be [https://etherscan.io/address/0x13b432914a996b0a48695df9b2d701eda45ff264 found] exclusively on [[Etherscan]]. While [[token]] related contracts are documented, DeFiSafety does not consider these in our analyses - in this instance we want to see the [[bridge]] contracts. There is no coverage of deployed contracts by software function documentation. However, there is API documentation that awards them 20% for this metric. There are no documented tests for code coverage in the Multichain [[Github|GitHub]] or audits. Multichain has not undergone a [[Formal Verification]] test. AnySwap has been audited once before launch (it is now known as multichain since a rebranding). It has been since [https://github.com/anyswap/Anyswap-Audit/ audited multiple times], with a [[Trail of Bits]] security assessment being released very recently."''


''"Anyswap will reward anyone who reports bugs to us. This will help us build truly secure and even better cross-chain solutions."''
With the [https://t.me/c/1453353094/7809 comment]:
 
''"Multichain still has its wires crossed, and this is proven by the exploits they've suffered. With a fantastically high bug bounty and a great audit track record, it's clear that security is important to Multichain. Indeed, when Multichain suffered a recent exploit it acted responsibly by compensating the affected as well as building a tool to reduce funds at risk. However, this protocol provides absolutely no [[oracle]] information and offers no testing documentation either. This is unacceptable for such a critical piece of [[DeFi]] infrastructure with $6B+ [[Total Value Locked (TVL)|TVL]] as it does. While this protocol should be commended for some aspects of its development, we strongly agree with [[Trail of Bits|TrailofBits]] when they say Multichain suffers from "an immature codebase" stemming from "incorrect protocol implementation" in "critical areas".'' "
*[https://www.rekt.news/anyswap-rekt/ From] [[Rekt]] (13-7-2021):
 
''"Anyswap will reward anyone who reports bugs to us. This will help us build truly secure and even better [[cross-chain]] solutions."''


*
*


===Bugs/Exploits===
===Bugs/Exploits===
* From [[Week In Ethereum|Week in Ethereum]] (22-1-2022):
* [https://www.defisafety.com/pqrs/418 From] [[DeFi Safety]] (15-3-2022):
''"On 10-1-2022 $3m were token from users via [[Smart Contract (SC)|smart contract]] vulnerabilities. Compensation plans were implemented. An effective token approval revoking tool was created by Multichain. This is evidence of good process quality. This was an insignificant amount compared to Mutlichain's massive [[Total Value Locked (TVL)|TVL]]."''
*From [[Week In Ethereum|Week in Ethereum]] (22-1-2022):
''"Multichain bridge [https://twitter.com/MultichainOrg/status/1483733455296860160 vulnerability], 600 [[Ethereum (ETH)|ETH]] exploited."''
''"Multichain bridge [https://twitter.com/MultichainOrg/status/1483733455296860160 vulnerability], 600 [[Ethereum (ETH)|ETH]] exploited."''
* [https://www.rekt.news/anyswap-rekt/ From] [[Rekt]] (13-7-2021):
* [https://www.rekt.news/anyswap-rekt/ From] [[Rekt]] (13-7-2021):


''"The funds lost were all $ pegged [[stablecoins]] totalling approximately $7.9M. The root of the exploit lay in the prototype V3 Router’s use of ECDSA, the algorithm securing its MPC wallet by generating private keys. This potential security flaw has been known since 2010, when console hacking group [https://fail0verflow.com/blog/ fail0verflow] detailed the process [https://web.archive.org/web/20150627235425/https://events.ccc.de/congress/2010/Fahrplan/attachments/1780_27c3_console_hacking_2010.pdf here] (p123-129). And its application to blockchain keys was later detailed in [https://web.archive.org/web/20160308014317/http://www.nilsschneider.net/2013/01/28/recovering-bitcoin-private-keys.html 2013]. Despite this, Anyswap’s [https://anyswap.medium.com/anyswap-multichain-router-v3-exploit-statement-6833f1b7e6fb post-mortem] states that the attacker detected a repeated k value in two of the V3 Router’s transactions on [[Binance|BSC]], and was able to back-calculate the [[Private Key|private key]].''
''"The funds lost were all $ pegged [[stablecoins]] totalling approximately $7.9M. The root of the exploit lay in the prototype V3 Router’s use of ECDSA, the algorithm securing its MPC [[wallet]] by generating [[private keys]]. This potential security flaw has been known since 2010, when console hacking group [https://fail0verflow.com/blog/ fail0verflow] detailed the process [https://web.archive.org/web/20150627235425/https://events.ccc.de/congress/2010/Fahrplan/attachments/1780_27c3_console_hacking_2010.pdf here] (p123-129). And its application to [[blockchain]] keys was later detailed in [https://web.archive.org/web/20160308014317/http://www.nilsschneider.net/2013/01/28/recovering-bitcoin-private-keys.html 2013]. Despite this, Anyswap’s [https://anyswap.medium.com/anyswap-multichain-router-v3-exploit-statement-6833f1b7e6fb post-mortem] states that the attacker detected a repeated k value in two of the V3 Router’s [[transactions]] on [[Binance|BSC]], and was able to back-calculate the [[Private Key|private key]].''


''Anyswap stressed that “only the new V3 cross-chain liquidity pools have been affected” and that the bridge remains operational via V1 and V2 Routers. The post-mortem also states that the V3’s code has been fixed and will reopen after the 48hr timelock installed by the team expires. Although action was taken relatively quickly to prevent another attack, [https://twitter.com/nicksdjohnson/status/1414512086672052238?s=20 @nicksdjohnson] is of the opinion that the patch does not do enough:''
''Anyswap stressed that “only the new V3 cross-chain [[liquidity]] pools have been affected” and that the bridge remains operational via V1 and V2 Routers. The post-mortem also states that the V3’s code has been fixed and will reopen after the 48hr timelock installed by the team expires. Although action was taken relatively quickly to prevent another attack, [https://twitter.com/nicksdjohnson/status/1414512086672052238?s=20 @nicksdjohnson] is of the opinion that the patch does not do enough:''


''"Setting aside the fact that there's a much better, industry standard solution to this, their patch: Fails catastrophically (exposing users to another hack) if you accidentally delete a file, or restore from an old backup, or move to a new server. And it requires every signature request to scan every previous one, but really that's the smallest problem here."''
''"Setting aside the fact that there's a much better, industry standard solution to this, their patch: Fails catastrophically (exposing users to another hack) if you accidentally delete a file, or restore from an old backup, or [[move]] to a new server. And it requires every [[signature]] [[request]] to scan every previous one, but really that's the smallest problem here."''


''Anyswap call themselves a “[[trustless]] protocol”, but perhaps that label no longer has the desired effect after such a damning evaluation from a leading [[Ethereum (ETH)|Ethereum]] developer."''
''Anyswap call themselves a “[[trustless]] protocol”, but perhaps that label no longer has the desired effect after such a damning evaluation from a leading [[Ethereum (ETH)|Ethereum]] developer."''


* [https://mobile.twitter.com/MultichainOrg/status/1483110393543544832 From] their Twitter (17-1-2022):
* [https://mobile.twitter.com/MultichainOrg/status/1483110393543544832 From] their [[Twitter]] (17-1-2022):
<blockquote>''Critical vulnerability that affected 6 tokens ([[Wrapped Ethereum (WETH)|WETH]], PERI, OMT, WBNB, [[Polygon (MATIC)|MATIC]], [[Avalanche (AVAX)|AVAX]]) has been reported and fixed. All assets on both V2 Bridge and V3 Router are safe, and cross-chain transactions can be done safely.:''</blockquote>
<blockquote>''Critical vulnerability that affected 6 [[tokens]] ([[Wrapped Ethereum (WETH)|WETH]], PERI, OMT, WBNB, [[Polygon (MATIC)|MATIC]], [[Avalanche (AVAX)|AVAX]]) has been reported and fixed. All assets on both V2 Bridge and V3 Router are safe, and cross-chain transactions can be done safely.:''</blockquote>
==Governance==
==Governance==
===Admin Key===
===Admin Key===


* Has a 48hr [[timelock]] ([https://www.rekt.news/anyswap-rekt/ 13-7-2021]).
* [https://www.defisafety.com/pqrs/418 From] [[DeFi Safety]] (15-3-2022):
''"[[Admin Key|Admin control]] information was not documented in any part of the documentation. The relevant [[Smart Contract (SC)|contracts]] are not identified as [[immutable]] / upgradeable. Ownership is not clearly indicated. Smart [[contract]] change capabilities are not identified in any contracts. Multichain's pause control is not documented. Multichain has no [[timelock]] documentation. It is clear that the [https://twitter.com/zhaojun_sh/status/1503017411682848770 founder is familiar] with the importance of timelock documentation when it comes to [[Decentralised Autonomous Organisation (DAO)|DAO]] contracts, so it stands to reason there should be timelock documentation for the rest of the protocol."''
*Has a 48hr [[timelock]] ([https://www.rekt.news/anyswap-rekt/ 13-7-2021]).


===DAO===
===DAO===
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==Technology==
==Technology==


*[[Whitepaper]] can be found [insert here].
*[[Whitepaper]] can be found [https://docs.multichain.org/ here].
*Code can be viewed [insert here].
*Code can be viewed [https://github.com/anyswap here]. [https://www.defisafety.com/pqrs/418 From] [[DeFi Safety]] (15-3-2022):
''"At 16 commits, the development history of Multichain's contract repository is not yet as rich as a portal to another world should be."''


===Implementations===
===Implementations===


*Built on: [[Binance|BSC]]
*Built on: [[Binance|BSC]] and [https://www.defisafety.com/pqrs/418 according] to [[DeFi Safety]] also covers the following chains (17-3-2022): [[Arbitrum]], [[Avalanche (AVAX)|Avalanche]], [[Celo (CELO)|Celo]], [[Ethereum (ETH)|Ethereum]], [[Fantom (FTM)|Fantom]], [[HECO]], [[Moonriver (MOVR)|Moonriver]], [[Polygon (MATIC)|Polygon]], [[Terra (LUNA)|Terra]], [[Aurora (EVM on NEAR)|Aurora]], [[Harmony (ONE)|Harmony]], [[Optimism]], [[Moonbeam (GLMR) & Moonriver (MOVR)|Moonbeam]] and [[Gnosis Chain (GNO)|Gnosis Chain]] (interestingly enough not mentioning BSC).
*Programming language used:
*Programming language used:


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===Fee Mechanism===
===Fee Mechanism===
===Upgrades===
===Upgrades===
===Mining===
===Staking===
===Staking===
====Validator Stats====
====Validator Stats====
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===Interoperability===
===Interoperability===


* Also behind Allbridge.
* Also behind [[Allbridge]].


===Other Details===
===Other Details===
==Oracle Method==
==Oracle Method==
* [https://www.defisafety.com/pqrs/418 From] [[DeFi Safety]] (15-3-2022):
''"Multichain uses an [https://docs.multichain.org/#the-smpc-network MPC network] instead of an [[oracle]] based system. The contracts dependent are identified. There is no relevant software function documentation. Multichain documents no [[front running]] mitigation strategies. This protocol documents no [[Flash Loan|flashloan]] countermeasures."''
==Privacy Method==
==Privacy Method==
==Compliance==
==Compliance==
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===Team===
===Team===


*Full team can be found [here].
*[https://www.defisafety.com/pqrs/418 From] [[DeFi Safety]] (15-3-2022):
''"Team members are [https://www.linkedin.com/company/multichainofficial/ public], though there is no one [[centralised]] list of employees.  This LinkedIn employment list is incomplete, the CEO (for example) is not here."''


===Funding===
===Funding===
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Making these free wiki pages is fun but takes a lot of effort and time.
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If you have enjoyed reading, tips are appreciated :) This will help us to keep expanding this archive of information.
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[[ETH]] tip [[address]]: 0x83460bE5F218b1520B69D702cE60A1DE37dD8E31
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Revision as of 12:09, 28 March 2022

Basics

  • Based in:
  • Started in / Announced on:
  • Testnet release:
  • Mainnet release:

History

Audits

"Contracts can be found exclusively on Etherscan. While token related contracts are documented, DeFiSafety does not consider these in our analyses - in this instance we want to see the bridge contracts. There is no coverage of deployed contracts by software function documentation. However, there is API documentation that awards them 20% for this metric. There are no documented tests for code coverage in the Multichain GitHub or audits. Multichain has not undergone a Formal Verification test. AnySwap has been audited once before launch (it is now known as multichain since a rebranding). It has been since audited multiple times, with a Trail of Bits security assessment being released very recently."

With the comment:

"Multichain still has its wires crossed, and this is proven by the exploits they've suffered. With a fantastically high bug bounty and a great audit track record, it's clear that security is important to Multichain. Indeed, when Multichain suffered a recent exploit it acted responsibly by compensating the affected as well as building a tool to reduce funds at risk. However, this protocol provides absolutely no oracle information and offers no testing documentation either. This is unacceptable for such a critical piece of DeFi infrastructure with $6B+ TVL as it does. While this protocol should be commended for some aspects of its development, we strongly agree with TrailofBits when they say Multichain suffers from "an immature codebase" stemming from "incorrect protocol implementation" in "critical areas". "

"Anyswap will reward anyone who reports bugs to us. This will help us build truly secure and even better cross-chain solutions."

Bugs/Exploits

"On 10-1-2022 $3m were token from users via smart contract vulnerabilities. Compensation plans were implemented. An effective token approval revoking tool was created by Multichain. This is evidence of good process quality. This was an insignificant amount compared to Mutlichain's massive TVL."

"Multichain bridge vulnerability, 600 ETH exploited."

"The funds lost were all $ pegged stablecoins totalling approximately $7.9M. The root of the exploit lay in the prototype V3 Router’s use of ECDSA, the algorithm securing its MPC wallet by generating private keys. This potential security flaw has been known since 2010, when console hacking group fail0verflow detailed the process here (p123-129). And its application to blockchain keys was later detailed in 2013. Despite this, Anyswap’s post-mortem states that the attacker detected a repeated k value in two of the V3 Router’s transactions on BSC, and was able to back-calculate the private key.

Anyswap stressed that “only the new V3 cross-chain liquidity pools have been affected” and that the bridge remains operational via V1 and V2 Routers. The post-mortem also states that the V3’s code has been fixed and will reopen after the 48hr timelock installed by the team expires. Although action was taken relatively quickly to prevent another attack, @nicksdjohnson is of the opinion that the patch does not do enough:

"Setting aside the fact that there's a much better, industry standard solution to this, their patch: Fails catastrophically (exposing users to another hack) if you accidentally delete a file, or restore from an old backup, or move to a new server. And it requires every signature request to scan every previous one, but really that's the smallest problem here."

Anyswap call themselves a “trustless protocol”, but perhaps that label no longer has the desired effect after such a damning evaluation from a leading Ethereum developer."

Critical vulnerability that affected 6 tokens (WETH, PERI, OMT, WBNB, MATIC, AVAX) has been reported and fixed. All assets on both V2 Bridge and V3 Router are safe, and cross-chain transactions can be done safely.:

Governance

Admin Key

"Admin control information was not documented in any part of the documentation. The relevant contracts are not identified as immutable / upgradeable. Ownership is not clearly indicated. Smart contract change capabilities are not identified in any contracts. Multichain's pause control is not documented. Multichain has no timelock documentation. It is clear that the founder is familiar with the importance of timelock documentation when it comes to DAO contracts, so it stands to reason there should be timelock documentation for the rest of the protocol."

DAO

Treasury

Token

Launch

Token Allocation

Utility

Other Details

Stablecoin

Coin Distribution

Technology

"At 16 commits, the development history of Multichain's contract repository is not yet as rich as a portal to another world should be."

Implementations

Transaction Details

How it works

Fee Mechanism

Upgrades

Staking

Validator Stats

Liquidity Mining

Scaling

Interoperability

Other Details

Oracle Method

"Multichain uses an MPC network instead of an oracle based system. The contracts dependent are identified. There is no relevant software function documentation. Multichain documents no front running mitigation strategies. This protocol documents no flashloan countermeasures."

Privacy Method

Compliance

Their Other Projects

Roadmap

  • Can be found [Insert link here].

Usage

Projects that use or built on it

Competition

Pros and Cons

Pros

Cons

Team, Funding and Partners

Team

"Team members are public, though there is no one centralised list of employees. This LinkedIn employment list is incomplete, the CEO (for example) is not here."

Funding

Partners

(:

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